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Abstract
This paper provides a microeconomic analysis of subsistence consumption in the
consumer theory framework. Our key concepts are ‘irrelevance’ of a good in cer-
tain consumption bundles (increasing its amount does not make the consumer
better off) and an ‘unhappy set’ (any bundle outside such a set is preferred to all
bundles inside). Using these concepts we axiomatize subsistence and saturation
induced irrelevance (SSI) preferences. We also axiomatize a generalized version
of Leontief (GL) preferences, for which irrelevance is solely driven by comple-
mentarity. Irrelevance in SSI preferences results from the presence of unhappy
sets; for GL preferences irrelevance is driven by their absence.
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“Of the nonpossession of the matter of subsistence in such quantity as is nec-
essary to the support of life, death is the consequence: and such natural death
is preceded by a course of suffering much greater than what is attendant on the
most aﬄictive violent deaths employed for the purpose of punishment.”
—Jeremy Bentham, Pannomial Fragments (1843).
1 Introduction
Subsistence is the minimum amount of basic necessities essential for a person’s survival.
Depending on the context, it can be expressed alternatively in terms of income (e.g.,
$1.25 per day) or in terms of nutrition such as a certain daily calorie requirement. It
forms the basis of poverty measurements: “...absolute poverty lines are often based on
estimates of the cost of basic food needs (i.e., the cost a nutritional basket considered
minimal for the healthy survival of a typical family), to which a provision is added for
non-food needs.” (World Bank, 2013). As extreme poverty and hunger continue to pose
a major global challenge, subsistence remains a useful concept for policymakers. For
instance, effective policies to end hunger require knowledge of not only the number of
hungry people, but also their food deficit or the depth of hunger, which is measured by
“comparing the average amount of dietary energy that undernourished people get from
the foods they eat with the minimum amount of dietary energy they need to maintain
body weight and undertake light activity.” (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, 2014).
Jeremy Bentham [2], one of the founding fathers of utility theory, considered “secur-
ing the existence of, and sufficiency of, the matter of subsistence for all the members of
the community” an important milestone towards achieving “the all embracing end—the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of the individuals belonging to the commu-
nity in question.” Yet an adequate treatment of subsistence consumption is lacking in
a standard utility maximization setting.1 The Stone-Geary utility function is widely
used to model subsistence.2 However, under this utility function a consumer is com-
pelled to consume above the subsistence level regardless of the price of the basic good,
thus assuming away the problem of poor people. In the Stone-Geary framework every
1Stigler [15] comments: “Occasionally it was stated that the marginal utility of a necessity falls
rapidly as its quantity increases and the like; and there were some mystical references to the infinite
utility of subsistence. These were ad hoc remarks, however, and were not explicitly developed parts
of the formal theory.”
2Rebelo [9] and Steger [13] use the Stone-Geary function to study the role of subsistence in economic
growth. See Sharif [12] for a survey of measurement issues of subsistence. Subsistence consumption
has also been associated with Giffen behavior, i.e., upward sloping demand curve (Jensen and Miller
[4]).
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consumer is prosperous by default, ignoring the possibility that a rise in food price
may take an individual from prosperity to poverty.
We present a microeconomic analysis of subsistence consumption in the consumer
theory framework.3 We axiomatize subsistence consumption in a setting where an
individual makes choices over two goods: a basic good which is a necessity such as
food and a non-basic good which can represent a composite of other commodities.4 In
developing our theory, we appeal to two distinct aspects of a basic necessity. First,
the individual requires a minimum critical level of this good. This is the subsistence
requirement. If this requirement is not met, then the non-basic good is not useful.
The non-basic good is useful only if the consumption of the basic good exceeds the
subsistence requirement. This calls for non-homotheticity in preferences, an issue which
has not received adequate attention (see Ray [8]). The second aspect is saturation,
which is in line with the concept of ‘abundance’ proposed by Bentham [2]. Saturation
implies that once the individual has consumed sufficiently large amounts of the basic
good, consuming more of it may not be beneficial.
Subsistence and saturation generate irrelevance of one of the goods. A good is irrel-
evant at a consumption bundle if increasing its amount without changing the amount
of the other good keeps the consumer indifferent. The non-basic good is irrelevant
when the subsistence requirement is not met, while the basic good becomes irrelevant
when its saturation is reached. Incorporating these features, we define subsistence and
saturation induced irrelevance (SSI) preferences. For such preferences there are poten-
tially three zones in the commodity space. Apart from the two zones where one of
the goods is irrelevant, there can be an intermediate region (where the consumption
of the basic good has exceeded the subsistence level but not yet reached saturation)
in which none of the goods is irrelevant. In this region the individual has a standard
consumer preference where two goods can be imperfect substitutes. SSI preferences
thus enrich consumer theory by allowing for the existence of poverty and prosperity
in different regions of the commodity space. This formalizes Bentham’s concepts of
subsistence and abundance in terms of individual preference. Theorem 1 axiomatizes
SSI preferences.
Irrelevance can also be induced by complementarity between the two goods. If an
individual prefers two spoons of sugar with every cup of tea and has one cup of tea,
3The Sanskrit word for bare subsistence gra¯sa¯ccha¯dana makes the components of subsistence par-
ticularly clear. It is a composite consisting of two words: gra¯sa (food) and a¯ccha¯dana (clothing).
4Jensen and Miller [5] also consider a two-good setting to study subsistence behavior. However,
both goods in their model are basic goods (food items that contribute calories) and there is substi-
tutability between them. Substitutability across different basic goods as an optimization problem was
first analyzed by Stigler [14].
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then sugar becomes irrelevant after two spoons. For such preferences (called Leontief
preferences), complementarity between the goods implies that at any consumption
bundle one of the two goods is saturated and therefore rendered irrelevant. Theorem
2 axiomatizes a generalized version of the Leontief (GL) preferences.
Apart from the notion of irrelevance, the other key concept that is central for our
axiomatizations is an unhappy set. Given a preference relation, a set of consumption
bundles is said to be an unhappy set if every bundle outside this set is preferred to all
bundles inside the set. This captures the state of a poor person who has extreme urge
to come out of poverty. To see how the notions of irrelevance and unhappy sets are
connected in our axioms, call a set of consumption bundles irrelevant in a certain good
if that good is irrelevant at all bundles of the set. For SSI preferences, the zone where
the subsistence requirement is not met is the largest unhappy set that is irrelevant
in the non-basic good. But for GL preferences, if a set is irrelevant in any good, it
can never be an unhappy set. Thus roughly speaking, SSI and GL preferences are
characterized by the presence or the absence of unhappiness in irrelevance. It is a case
of too little versus too much. Irrelevance of the non-basic good in SSI preferences stems
from the fact that there is too little of the basic good. For GL preferences, irrelevance
of a good is driven by too much of that good in relation to the other good.
von-Neumann and Morgenstern [16] introduced the notion of external stability as
part of a solution concept in cooperative game theory. Unhappy sets can be inter-
preted as sets that have ‘strong external instability’. For a preference relation a set
of consumption bundles is ‘externally stable’ if for any bundle outside this set we can
find a bundle in this set which is preferred to it. So a set is ‘not externally stable’ if
there exists a bundle outside this set which is at least as good as all bundles inside.
Our definition of unhappy set strengthens this notion of not external stability since we
require that each bundle in an unhappy set is dominated (not just weakly but strictly)
by all bundles (and not just by one bundle) outside the set.
To the best of our knowledge subsistence requirement has never been incorporated
in the preference based approach of consumer behavior. Fishburn [3] axiomatized
lexicographic preferences.5 A lexicographic preference imposes a linear order on the
two goods making it discontinuous. In SSI, if the consumer is in the subsistence zone,
then the preference ordering over all bundles having different amounts of the basic
good follows lexicographic order. However, this order breaks down when we compare
any two bundles in the subsistence zone with the same amount of the basic good.
5Axiomatizations of other different consumer preferences include Milnor [7], Maskin [6], Segal and
Sobel [11]. The main difference of our approach from this literature is that our axioms are on the
regions of irrelevance embedded in SSI and GL preferences.
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In SSI these two bundles lie on the the same indifferent curve while in lexicographic
this is not the case. This is why unlike a lexicographic preference, SSI is continuous.
We also show that unhappy sets can be used to axiomatize lexicographic preferences
(Proposition 1).
Basu and Van [1] use subsistence and lexicographic ordering to define the preference
of a household over two goods: a consumption good and a binary choice on whether or
not to send the child to work. The preference is specified using the luxury axiom which
says that a household will send its child to work only if its consumption without child
labor income drops below the subsistence level. In contrast to SSI, the luxury axiom
induces lexicographic order in the non-subsistence zone since in this zone the household
does not send the child to work even if child labor yields higher consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. After providing the main framework in Section
2, we axiomatize SSI preferences in Section 3. In Section 4 we present axiomatization
of GL preferences. Finally, implications of irrelevance and proofs of the results are
provided in an appendix.
2 The main framework
Consider the problem of an individual in a two-good setting where the set of goods
is {1, 2}. The individual has a consumption set X = X1 × X2 where Xi = R+ for
i ∈ {1, 2}, and X = R2+. A consumption bundle is x = (x1, x2) ∈ X where xi stands
for the amount of good i. Generic points in X will be denoted by x, y, z. If for all
i ∈ {1, 2}: (a) xi > yi, then we say x > y, (b) xi ≥ yi, then x ≥ y and (c) xi = yi, then
x = y.
The individual’s preference on X is defined using the binary relation “at least as
good as”. We write x % y for “x is at least as good as y”. The preference relation %
on X is rational (that is, complete and transitive).6 The strict preference is defined as
x  y ⇔ [x % y] and not [y % x]. The indifference relation is defined as x ∼ y ⇔ [x % y]
and [y % x]. The preference relation % on X is continuous if for any sequence of pairs
of bundles {(xn, yn)} with xn % yn for all n, limn→∞ xn = x, and limn→∞ yn = y, we
have x % y. It is monotone if for any x, y ∈ X with x > y, we have x  y.
6The preference relation % on X is complete if for any x, y ∈ X, either x % y or y % x or both. It
is transitive if for any x, y, z ∈ X, [x % y and y % z]⇒ x % z.
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2.1 SSI preferences
A basic necessity such as food has two key features. The first feature is the subsistence
requirement: the individual requires a minimum critical level of the necessity. If this
requirement is not met, other goods are not useful. The second feature is saturation.
Beyond a point, consuming more of it may not be beneficial. For a preference relation
in a two-good setting, the common aspect of these two features is ‘irrelevance’ in one
of the two goods:
Definition 1 Good 2 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 > x2. Similarly
Good 1 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 > x1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, Good i
is relevant at a bundle x if it is not irrelevant there.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. We say that a bundle y involves xi if yi = xi. Thus, the set
of all bundles involving xi is {y ∈ X|yi = xi}.
Definition 2 Consider a preference relation % on X which is rational, continuous and
monotone. It is subsistence and saturation induced irrelevance preference (or an SSI
preference) with respect to Good 1 if it satisfies the following properties.
(I) Subsistence: ∃ Q ∈ (0,∞) such that
(a) Subsistence zone [0, Q]: for every x1 ∈ [0, Q], Good 2 is irrelevant at all
bundles involving x1;
(b) Weak non-subsistence zone (Q,∞): for every x1 > Q, ∃ y1 ∈ (Q, x1) such
that Good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving y1.
(II) Weak saturation: ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and Q(x2) ∈ R+ such that Good 1 is irrelevant at
x if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and it is relevant at x if x1 < Q(x2).
Definition 2 has zones of subsistence, weak non-subsistence and weak saturation in
preferences. Here Good 1 is the basic good and Q stands for the subsistence threshold.
Good 2 is the non-basic good. For instance, if Good 1 represents food, then Q stands
for the critical amount of food that corresponds to the minimum calorie requirements
of the individual. The subsistence zone specifies that if the consumption of Good 1 is
below this critical level, then Good 2 does not have any benefit (property I(a)).
Property I(b) says that once the amount of Good 1 exceeds Q we can always find
a bundle with lower amount of Good 1 at which Good 2 is relevant. In other words,
for any x1 = Q + ε (where ε > 0, no matter how small), there is y1 ∈ (Q,Q + ε) such
that Good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving y1. Once x1 > Q, we are in the weak
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non-subsistence zone in that the total irrelevance of Good 2 disappears there. As we
shall see, the properties of SSI preference ensure the existence of a subset of the weak
non-subsistence zone that is a non-subsistence zone in a stronger sense.
Property (II) of the definition says that there is at least one x2 ∈ X2 and a corre-
sponding threshold Q(x2) such that for consumption bundles involving x2, any unit of
Good 1 beyond Q(x2) has no benefit. This captures the saturation aspect of a basic
good in a weak sense.7
The SSI preference has two implications that are stated in Observation 1. First,
there is a natural order between the threshold of subsistence and any threshold of
weak saturation: for any x2 ∈ X2 where weak saturation holds, we have Q ≤ Q(x2).
Second, for any consumption bundle where the amount of the basic good exceeds
the weak saturation level (that is, x1 > Q(x2)), the non-basic good is necessarily
beneficial. Formally, call an interval (a,∞) ⊆ X1 a strong non-subsistence zone with
respect to Good 1 if for every x1 ∈ (a,∞) there is a bundle involving x1 at which Good
2 is relevant. We show that if weak saturation holds for x2 ∈ X2, then the interval
(Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone. That is, for every x1 > Q(x2), there is a
bundle involving x1 at which Good 2 is relevant.
Observation 1 For an SSI preference consider any x2 ∈ X2 at which weak saturation
(property (II)) holds. Then Q ≤ Q(x2), with strict inequality if x2 > 0. Moreover, the
interval (Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone with respect to Good 1.
Example 1 For x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ consider the following continuous utility function
u(x) =

x1 if x1 ≤ 1,
1 + min{√(x1 − 1)x2, x2} if (1 < x1 ≤ 2) or (x1 > 2 and x2 ≤ 1),
1 + min
{√
(x1 − 1)x2, 1+
√
1+4(x1−1)(x2−1)
2
}
if x1 > 2 and x2 > 1.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 1. This utility func-
tion represents an SSI preference with respect to Good 1 with subsistence zone [0, 1],
that is, Q = 1. Note that (1,∞) ⊂ X1 is a strong (and hence weak) non-subsistence
zone. The weak saturation property holds for x2 ∈ [0, 2]. For any such x2, there is
Q(x2) = x2 + 1 (see Figure 1) such that Good 1 is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and
relevant if x1 < Q(x2). Note that Q(0) = Q and Q(x2) > Q for x2 ∈ (0, 2]. As shown in
7A stronger notion of saturation requires that such a property holds for every x2 ∈ X2. Formally,
there is strong saturation with respect to Good 1 if for every x2 ∈ X2, ∃ Q(x2) ∈ R+ such that Good
1 is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥ Q(x2) and it is relevant at x if x1 < Q(x2).
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Observation 1, (x2 + 1,∞) ⊂ X1 is a strong non-subsistence zone for every x2 ∈ [0, 2].
Finally observe that at any bundle with x1 > 1 and x2 > 2, both goods are relevant.
Let us see a particular context in which the properties of Example 1 are meaningful.
Suppose Good 1 is food and Good 2 is physical activity, broadly construed. For
instance, it can stand for labor which can bring monetary benefits or it can be sports
which keeps the individual healthy. In the subsistence zone the individual does not have
sufficient nutrition, so he is too weak to have any benefit from physical activity. Above
this zone, for any x2 ≤ 2, there is a threshold (given by x2 + 1) beyond which Good 1
is not useful. This is because to sustain low levels of physical activity the individual
does not require an ever increasing amount of food and saturation is reached after a
while. In particular, when x2 = 0 (no physical activity), saturation is reached at the
subsistence level (see Figure 1). There is no point of saturation once x2 > 2. More
nutrition is needed to carry out more demanding physical activities, which explains the
absence of saturation for higher values of x2.
Examples 2,3 that follow present SII preferences with strong saturation, in which for
any x2 ∈ X2, the saturation threshold Q(x2) is a constant independent of x2. Whether
saturation in an SII preference is weak or strong depends on how the non-basic good
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relates with the basic good. In the following examples Good 2 is considered to be a non-
basic consumption good, which does not share the same relation that physical activity
has with food. For such cases it is more natural that regardless of the amount of Good
2, saturation of Good 1 is reached once the individual has consumed sufficiently large
amounts of it.
2.2 SSI preferences and Stone-Geary utility functions
Stony-Geary utility functions are often used to model subsistence. We provide examples
of an SII preference to point out some drawbacks of Stone-Geary utility functions.
Example 2 Let 0 < Q < Q < ∞. For x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ define the net-usefulness
function g : X1 → R+ as
g(x1) :=

0 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
x1 −Q if Q < x1 < Q,
Q−Q if x1 ≥ Q.
(1)
That is, g(x1) = max{x1 −Q, 0}+ min{Q− x1, 0}. The net-usefulness function g(.) is
continuous, non-decreasing and piecewise linear. This function captures the usefulness
of the basic good beyond subsistence requirement. Using the net-usefulness function,
consider the following utility function, where 0 < α < 1.
u(x) = min{x1, Q}+ [g(x1)]αx1−α2 . (2)
Equivalently,
u(x) =

x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
Q+
(
x1 −Q
)α
x1−α2 if Q < x1 < Q,
Q+
(
Q−Q)α x1−α2 if x1 ≥ Q. (3)
The preference represented by (3) is an SSI preference (with strong saturation). We
normalize the price of Good 2 to be 1. The price of Good 1 is p > 0 and the income
is w > 0. Let w(p) = pQ, w(p) = pQ and ŵ(p) = w(p) + (1 − α)p(Q − Q)/α. The
(unique) solution x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) to this utility maximization problem is
x∗ =

(
w
p
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p)],(
Q+ α(w−w(p))
p
, (1− α)(w − w(p))
)
if w ∈ (w(p), ŵ(p)) ,(
Q, (w − pQ)) if w ≥ ŵ(p). (4)
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Observe that the utility function (3) is different from the Stone-Geary utility function.
For Q < x1 < Q in (3), u(x) resembles the Stone-Geary utility function, but there
is a qualitative difference. The minimum income required to achieve the subsistence
consumption Q is w(p) = pQ which is a function of p. This important aspect, intrinsic
to subsistence, is missing from the Stone-Geary utility function as it implicitly assumed
that any consumer always has enough wealth to stay outside the subsistence zone
without any reference to the price of the basic (subsistence) good. However, an increase
in the price of certain basic good such as foodgrains may very well push a consumer
from non-subsistence to subsistence zone.
Also note that if w ≥ w(p) = pQ, the consumer can afford the saturation level Q
of the basic good. However, for the interval [w(p), ŵ(p)), it is optimal to buy less than
saturation level of the basic good and more of the non-basic good.
The next example highlights the possibility of subsistence inertia: even if a con-
sumer has adequate income to buy more than subsistence level of the basic good
(w > pQ) and avail both goods, it might still be optimal to not to buy the non-
basic good at all. That is, even outside the subsistence zone a consumer may continue
to buy only the basic good.
Example 3 Let 0 < Q < Q < ∞. Using the net-usefulness function g(.) defined in
Example 2, for x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ consider the utility function
u(x) = min{x1, Q}+ g(x1)x2 (5)
which can be equivalently written as
u(x) =

x1 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q,
x1 + (x1 −Q)x2 if Q < x1 < Q,
Q+ (Q−Q)x2 if x1 ≥ Q.
(6)
Note that this utility function also represents an SSI preference (with strong satura-
tion). As before, the price of Good 2 is normalized at 1, the price of Good 1 is p > 0
and the income is w > 0. Denote w(p) = pQ and w(p) = pQ.
For 0 < p ≤ 1/(Q − Q), the (unique) solution x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) to this utility maxi-
mization problem is
x∗ =
{ (
w
p
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p)],(
Q,w − w(p)) if w ≥ w(p). (7)
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For p > 1/(Q−Q), let δ = p(Q−Q)− 1 > 0. The (unique) solution x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) to
this utility maximization problem is
x∗ =

(
w
p
, 0
)
if w ∈ (0, w(p) + 1],(
w(p)+w+1
2p
, w−w(p)−1
2
)
if w ∈ (w(p) + 1, w(p) + δ) ,(
Q,w − w(p)) if w ≥ w(p) + δ. (8)
Note that when w > w(p), the consumer can afford more than the subsistence level
Q of Good 1 and positive amount of Good 2. Yet there exist intervals (w(p), w(p)] for
(7) and (w(p), w(p) + 1] for (8) where it is optimal not to buy Good 2 at all. For (7)
buying Good 2 (keeping Good 1 fixed at Q) is optimal only when income is above w(p).
However, for (8), although the consumer can afford the saturation level Q of Good 1
if w > w(p), there is an interval [w(p), w(p) + δ) where it is optimal to buy less than
the saturation level of Good 1 and more of Good 2.
These examples demonstrate a glimpse of the intricacies of consumer behavior that
can be associated with SSI preferences.
2.3 SII and lexicographic preferences
The preference relation % on X is a lexicographic preference with linear order 1 <0 2
on the two goods if the following hold: x % y if either x1 > y1 or x1 = y1 and x2 ≥ y2.
Consider two bundles that are in the subsistence zone of an SSI preference. If they have
different amounts of Good 1 (like points x = (x1, x2) and z = (z1, z2) in Figure 1), then
their preference ordering in the SSI is same as lexicographic. However, if the bundles
have the same amount of Good 1 (like points x = (x1, x2) and y = (x1, y2) in Figure 1),
the orderings of SSI and lexicographic are very different. Such bundles lie in the same
indifference curve for SSI, while for lexicographic, they are strictly ordered in terms of
the amount of Good 2. Indeed, SSI preference is continuous while lexicographic is not.
On the other hand, lexicographic is strong monotone, while SSI is not.8
Lexicographic order with subsistence was used by Basu and Van [1] to define a
household’s preference for the consumption good relative to child labor (which is binary
choice on whether or not to send the child to work). By contrast, our objective is to
analyze preferences with subsistence and saturation for the basic good relative to the
non-basic good in a standard utility theory framework.
8The preference relation % on X is strong monotone if for any x, y ∈ X such that x ≥ y and x 6= y,
x  y.
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2.4 Unhappy sets
We introduce the notion of unhappy sets which will be used in our axiomatizations.
Definition 3 For a preference relation % on X, a set S ⊆ X is an unhappy set if for
any y 6∈ S, y  x for every x ∈ S.
For any preference relation % on X, the empty set and the set X are both unhappy
sets. Both lower contour and strict lower contour sets of any x ∈ X are unhappy sets.9
Specifically, S is an unhappy set if and only if S = ∪x∈SL(x).10
Remark 1 For discontinuous preferences, lower contour sets may not be closed but
one can find closed unhappy sets. Consider a lexicographic preference with linear order
1 <0 2. For any x ∈ X, L(x) = {y ∈ X | y1 < x1} ∪ {y ∈ X | y1 = x1, y2 ≤ x2} which
is not closed. Let T (x1) = {y ∈ X | y1 ≤ x1} = L(x) ∪ {y ∈ X | y1 = x1, y2 > x2}.
Clearly, L(x) ⊂ T (x1) and T (x1) is a closed set. Note that T (x1) is an unhappy set.
To see this, consider any y ∈ T (x1) and z 6∈ T (x1). Since z1 > x1 ≥ y1, we have z  y,
which shows that T (x1) is an unhappy set.
9For any % on X and x ∈ X, the lower contour set of x is L(x) = {y ∈ X | x % y} and the strict
lower contour set of x is L¯(x) = {y ∈ X | x  y}.
10Take any x ∈ S. Since x ∈ L(x), it is immediate that S ⊆ ∪x∈SL(x). For the converse, if y ∈ L(x)
and x ∈ S, then by definition of an unhappy set y ∈ S. Therefore, L(x) ⊆ S for all x ∈ S. Hence
∪x∈SL(x) ⊆ S.
12
3 Axiomatization of SSI preferences
LetB1 := {x ∈ X| Good 2 is irrelevant at x}, B2 := {x ∈ X| Good 1 is irrelevant at x}.
Thus the set B1 (the set B2) is the set of all bundles at which Good 2 (Good 1) is ir-
relevant.
Also define A1 := {x1 ∈ X1|∃x2 ∈ X2 such that x = (x1, x2) ∈ B1} and A2 :=
{x2 ∈ X2|∃x1 ∈ X1 such that x = (x1, x2) ∈ B2}. Therefore, for i 6= j, Ai ⊆ Xi is the
set of all elements xi for which there exists a bundle involving xi at which Good j is
irrelevant.
We characterize SSI preferences using Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. Axiom 1 requires that
irrelevance of the non-basic good is at least partially driven by inadequacy of the basic
good. Axiom 2 requires that there exists at least one bundle where the basic good is
irrelevant. Thus for each of the two goods there is a structural transition in preference.
Theorem 1 shows that this requirement uniquely characterizes SSI preferences.
Axiom 1 Unhappiness driven irrelevance: B1 has an unhappy subset of positive area.
Axiom 2 B2 is non-empty.
Theorem 1 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, continu-
ous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(SSI1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2.
(SSI2) The preference relation % on X is a SSI preference with respect to X1.
Idea of the proof: To see that SSI satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2, first observe
that the set S := {x ∈ X | x1 ∈ [0, Q)} ⊆ B1 since Good 2 is irrelevant for any
consumption bundle in S. Moreover, by monotonicity of preference any bundle in
X \ S is strictly preferred to any bundle in S. Hence S is an unhappy set of positive
area implying Axiom 1. Property (II) of SSI implies Axiom 2.
To prove that Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 imply SSI preference we use the following
chain of arguments. First, by Axiom 1 there is a subset S ⊆ B1 which is an unhappy
set of positive area. Therefore, there exists x ∈ S such that x1 > 0 (see Figure
2). By monotonicity of preference x is at least as good as any point in the rectangle
OExA. Since S is an unhappy set, any point in this rectangle must be in S and
hence in B1. In particular for all points lying on the line OE, Good 2 is irrelevant and
hence all indifference curves are parallel vertical lines in this region. This indicates the
existence of a subsistence zone and in particular the interval OE is its subset. To fully
characterize the subsistence zone we have to use Axiom 2.
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Axiom 2 requires non-emptiness of B2 and hence there exists y = (y1, y2) ∈ B2. The
point (y1, 0) must be to the right of OE, otherwise two indifference curves will intersect.
This implies that B2 cannot have an unhappy set of positive area. To see this note
that if B2 has an unhappy subset of positive area, then, by using the arguments of
the previous paragraph, there will be a region where indifference curves are parallel
horizontal lines each meeting the horizontal axis which is not possible (see IC(y)in
Figure 2).
Finally, non-emptiness of B2 gives rise to weak saturation. More importantly the
subsistence zone must be bounded since (y1, 0) and anything to the right of it cannot
belong to the subsistence zone. Existence of non-subsistence follows.
-
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3.1 Robustness of Axiom 2
The generalized Leontief preference (defined in the next section) satisfies Axiom 2 but
not Axiom 1. Hence we only need to check the robustness of Axiom 2 which requires
that the set B2 must be non-empty. This is useful not only to generate weak saturation,
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but it is also necessary for the existence of a non-subsistence zone. Without it, a non-
subsistence zone might not exist. Without a reference to a situation of non-subsistence,
the notion of subsistence may not be meaningful.
Corollary 1 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, contin-
uous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(S1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1.
(S2) For the preference relation % on X, either property (I) of Definition 2 holds, or
Good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles.
Recall that in property (I) of Definition 2, the subsistence zone is [0, Q] for 0 < Q <
∞, which results in a non-subsistence zone (Q,∞). The preference in (S2) of Corollary
1 includes the case where Q =∞, in which case there is no non-subsistence zone with
respect to Good 1, rendering the other Good 2 to be irrelevant at all bundles. In that
case T (x1) = {y ∈ X | y1 ∈ [0, x1]} is an unhappy set for all x1 ∈ X. Lexicographic
preference shares the same property but is strong monotone (so both goods are relevant
at all bundles). In fact, strong monotonicity together with this property characterizes
the lexicographic preference.
Proposition 1 A complete and strong monotone preference relation % on X is a
lexicographic preference with linear order 1 <0 2 if and only if T (x1) = {y ∈ X | y1 ∈
[0, x1]} is an unhappy set for all x1 ∈ X1.
4 Generalized Leontief preferences
In the previous section we characterized the SSI preference that had the feature that
each good had stretches of irrelevance. The only well-known preference where irrel-
evance in both goods exists is the Leontief preference. For this preference at least
one good is irrelevant at any bundle x ∈ X. Thus irrelevance spans the entire do-
main of preference. Formally, a preference relation % on X is the Leontief pref-
erences if there exists a > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ X, x % y if and only if
min{ax1, x2} ≥ min{ay1, y2}. Observe that there exists a linear function F (x1) = ax1
such that given any x1 ∈ X1, both goods are irrelevant at (x1, F (x1)), Good 1 is ir-
relevant at (y1, F (x1)) for any y1 > x1 and Good 2 is irrelevant at (x1, y2) for any
y2 > F (x1). The ratio 1/a is the fixed coefficient of substitutability between the two
goods. For Leontief preference there is no apparent pressing need to keep the substi-
tution fixed across the two goods. For example, with one cup of tea a day, a consumer
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may want two spoons of sugar, but if the same consumer drinks ten cups of tea a day,
he may take less than twenty spoons of sugar if he is diabetic. Thus for the Leontief
preference the proportion of substitutability may well vary as we vary the amount of
any one good (say Good 1). Incorporating this generality of variable substitutability,
ceteris paribus, we define the ‘generalized Leontief’ preference as follows.
Definition 4 The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference (or a
GL preference) if there exists an onto (surjective)11 and increasing function F : X1 →
X2 with F (0) = 0 such that for any x1 ∈ X1:
(i) at any bundle (x1, F (x1)), both goods X1 and X2 are irrelevant,
(ii) Good 1 is irrelevant at any bundle (y1, F (x1)) for y1 > x1, and
(iii) Good 2 is irrelevant at any bundle (x1, y2) for y2 > F (x1).
Observe that since F is onto and increasing, it is also one-to-one and continuous.
The domain of the inverse function of F is X2.
Axiom 3 Irrelevance without unhappiness: Neither B1 nor B2 has an unhappy subset
of positive area.
Axiom 4 Spanning axiom: A1 = X1, A2 = X2 and B1 ∪B2 = X.
We axiomatize GL preferences using these two axioms. Monotonicity of preference
ensures that B1 and B2 both cannot have an unhappy set of positive area (Lemma 1).
Hence Axiom 3 is the compliment of Axiom 1 (allowing for relabeling of the goods).
Theorem 2 Consider a preference relation % on X = R2+ which is rational, continu-
ous and monotone. The following statements are equivalent.
(GL1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 3 and Axiom 4.
(GL2) The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference.
Idea of the proof: For GL preferences, Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2. Moreover, B1 =
{x ∈ X | x2 ≥ F (x1)}, B2 = {x ∈ X | x2 ≤ F (x1)} and so B1 ∪ B2 = X. Therefore,
we have Axiom 4. For any x ∈ Bi, there exists y 6∈ Bi such that x is indifferent to y.
Hence there does not exist an unhappy subset of Bi. Thus Axiom 3 holds.
11A function F : X1 → X2 is an onto or a surjective function if for any x2 ∈ X2, ∃ x1 ∈ X1 such
that F (x1) = x2.
16
To see the converse consider any x = (x1, x2) > (0, 0) and, given Axiom 4, assume
without loss of generality that x ∈ B1. If (x1, 0) ∈ B1, then S = {y ∈ X | y1 ∈ [0, x1)}
is an unhappy set of positive area. Since B1 ∪ B2 = X (Axiom 4) and indifference
curves cannot intersect it follows that S ⊂ B1, contradicting Axiom 3. So we must
have (x1, 0) ∈ B2. Then the indifference curve containing x cannot meet the horizontal
axis. Hence there exists y2 ∈ (0, x2] such that (x1, y2) ∈ B2 and (x1, z2) ∈ B1 for all
z2 ≥ y2. Let y2 = F (x1). Using Ai = Xi (for i = 1, 2) it can be shown that F (.) is an
onto and increasing function with F (0) = 0.
4.1 Robustness of axioms
Axiom 3 and Axiom 4 have three requirements: (i) Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2, (ii) B1 ∪B2 =
X, and (iii) none of B1 and B2 has an unhappy subset of positive area. In each of the
following examples, only one of requirements (i)-(iii) is violated, and we see that we do
not get the generalized Leontief preference.
Example 4 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where k > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
min {x1/(k − x1), x2} if x1 < k,
x2 if x1 ≥ k.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 4. For this example,
B1 ∪ B2 = X and none of B1 and B2 has an unhappy set of positive area. However,
A1 = [0, k) although A2 = X2. This preference is not GL but is “locally Leontief” (for
x1 < k) with saturation of Good 1 at x1 = k.
Example 5 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where k > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
x1 if x1 ≤ k,
k + min{x1 − k, x2} if x1 > k.
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 5. For this example,
Axiom 4 holds. But Axiom 3 does not hold since B1 has an unhappy subset of positive
area. The set {(x1, x2)|x1 ∈ [0, k], x2 ∈ X2} ⊂ B1 is an unhappy set. We get “locally
Leontief” (for x1 > k) and subsistence with respect to Good 1 for x1 ≤ k.
Example 6 Consider the preference represented by the utility function
u(x1, x2) =

x2 if x2 ≤ x1/2,
(x1 + x2)/3 if x1/2 < x2 < 2x1,
x1 if x2 ≥ 2x1.
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Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 6. For this example,
Axiom 3 holds and Ai = Xi for i = 1, 2. However, B1 ∪B2 6= X.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Observation 1: Let x2 ∈ X2 be such that property (II) holds there. For
the first part, suppose on the contrary that Q > Q(x2). Then (Q(x2), x2) ∼ (Q, x2)
(by property (II)) and (Q, x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 (by property (I)(a)). By
transitivity, (Q(x2), x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 which violates monotonicity. So we
must have Q ≤ Q(x2).
Let x2 > 0. If Q = Q(x2) = Q, then (Q, 0) ∼ (Q, x2) (by (I)(a)) and (Q, x2) ∼ x for
any x1 > Q (by (II)), implying (Q, 0) ∼ x for any x1 > Q which violates monotonicity.
So we must have Q < Q(x2) if x2 > 0.
To prove that (Q(x2),∞) is a strong non-subsistence zone with respect to Good 1,
we have to show that for any x1 > Q(x2), Good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving
x1. Suppose, on the contrary, ∃ x1 > Q(x2) such that Good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles
involving x1. Then x ∼ (x1, y2) for any y2 > x2. But since x1 > Q(x2), by property
(II) we have x ∼ (Q(x2), x2). By transitivity, (x1, y2) ∼ (Q(x2), x2), which violates
monotonicity, a contradiction.
5.1 Irrelevance: some implications
We define two functions f1, f2 : X → {0, 1} that captures the notion of irrelevance.
f1(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 ≥ x1,
1 otherwise.
f2(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 ≥ x2,
1 otherwise.
The function f1(x) captures irrelevance of Good 1 at bundle x. Similarly, the function
f2(x) captures irrelevance of Good 2 at bundle x. Observation 2 shows that if a good is
irrelevant at a bundle, then it continues to remain so for all bundles where its quantity
is increased keeping the quantity of the other good unchanged. Observation 2 also
shows that the converse is true, which is proved using continuity of the preference
relation.
Observation 2 (i) f2(x) = 0 ⇔ f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2 and (ii) f1(x) = 0 ⇔
f1(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 > x1.
Proof: We prove (i), proof of (ii) is similar. Let f2(x) = 0. Then x ∼ (x1, y2) for any
y2 > x2. Hence (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for any z2 > y2 > x2, implying that f2(x1, y2) = 0.
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Conversely, let f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2. Then (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for all z2 >
y2 > x2. Let x
n = (x1, x2+1/n) and y
n = (x1, y2+1/n) for n = 1, 2, . . . . Then x
n ∼ yn,
and hence xn % yn for n = 1, 2, . . . . Since limn→∞ xn = x and limn→∞ yn = (x1, y2), by
continuity we have x % (x1, y2). Since y2 > x2, by monotonicity we have (x1, y2) % x.
We then conclude that x ∼ (x1, y2) for any y2 > x2, proving that f2(x) = 0.
We conclude from Observation 2 that for every xi ∈ Ai, ∃ αi(xi) ∈ Xj = R+ such
that
fj(x) =
{
0 if xj ≥ αi(xi),
1 otherwise.
(9)
It follows from (9) that Bi = {x ∈ X|xi ∈ Ai, xj ≥ αi(xi)}. For xi ∈ Ai, let Bi(xi)
be the set of all bundles involving xi at which good j is irrelevant, that is, Bi(xi) :=
{y ∈ X|yi = xi, yj ≥ αi(xi)}. It is immediate that Bi = ∪xi∈AiBi(xi). For any xi ∈ Xi,
define the set of all bundles involving xi as Mi(xi) := {y ∈ X|yi = xi}. Observe that
for any xi ∈ Ai, Bi(xi) ⊆ Mi(xi). Moreover Bi(xi) = Mi(xi) if and only if αi(xi) = 0.
The last equality implies that good j is irrelevant at all bundles involving xi.
Observation 3
(i) Let xi, yi ∈ Ai and yi < xi. Then x  y for any x ∈ Bi(xi) and y ∈ Bi(yi).
(ii) Let xi > 0. If Bi(yi) = Mi(yi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi), then xi ∈ Ai and Bi(xi) =
Mi(xi).
Proof: Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), let i = 1.
(i) Let y ∈ B1(y1). Consider any z2 > max{y2, α1(x1)}. Then (x1, z2) ∈ B1(x1).
Since x1 > y1 and z2 > y2, by monotonicity (x1, z2)  y. Since (x1, z2) ∼ x for any
x ∈ B1(x1) the result follows from transitivity.
(ii) Consider two sequences xn = (x1 − 1/n, x2), yn = (x1 − 1/n, 0) where x2 > 0
and n > 1/x1. Since y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0 for y1 ∈ [0, x1), we have xn, yn ∈
M1(x1 − 1/n) = B1(x1 − 1/n). Hence xn ∼ yn and in particular, yn % xn. Since
limn→∞ xn = x and limn→∞ yn = (x1, 0), by continuity we have (x1, 0) % x. Since
x2 > 0, by monotonicity we have x % (x1, 0), implying that x ∼ (x1, 0) for any x2 > 0.
This proves the result.
Consider any two arbitrary bundles at both of which Good j is irrelevant. The
first part of Observation 3 shows that the preference ordering of these two bundles is
completely determined by amounts of Good i. The second part shows that if for any
yi < xi, Good j is irrelevant at all bundles involving yi, then Good j is also irrelevant
at all bundles involving xi.
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5.2 SSI preferences
We start with the following definition. For i = 1, 2, a set S ⊆ Bi is a maximal unhappy
subset of Bi if (a) S is an unhappy set and (b) @ T ⊆ Bi such that T is an unhappy
set and S ⊂ T. Lemma 1 (that follows) will be used to prove Theorem 1. Part (I) of
Lemma 1 shows that if for some x1 > 0, Good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles involving
any y1 ∈ [0, x1] then Axiom 1 holds. Part (II) shows that the converse is also true.
Moreover, if Axiom 1 holds, then B1 has a unique maximal unhappy subset S which
has the property that if x = (x1, x2) ∈ S, then (x1, 0) ∈ S and consequently Good 2 is
irrelevant at all bundles involving x1. Finally if Axiom 1 holds, then B2 cannot have
an unhappy subset of positive area.
Given Axiom 1, an immediate consequence of Lemma 1(I) is that the set T (x1) =
{y ∈ X | y1 ∈ [0, x1]} ⊆ B1 is an unhappy set and the indifference curves in T (x1) are
all parallel to the X2 axis.
Lemma 1 (I) If x1 > 0, [0, x1] ⊆ A1 and B1(y1) = M1(y1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1], then
Axiom 1 holds.
(II) Suppose Axiom 1 holds.
(i) Let S ⊆ B1 be an unhappy set of positive area. If x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0
for all y1 ∈ [0, x1] and ∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S.
(ii) B1 has a unique maximal unhappy subset S, which has the following prop-
erties: Either (a) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) or (b) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some
x1 ∈ (0,∞), or (c) S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) Suppose (a) or (b) of (ii) holds. Then for every x1 > x1, ∃ y1 ∈ (x1, x1)
such that either y1 /∈ A1, or y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) > 0.
(iv) B2 cannot have an unhappy subset of positive area.
Proof of Lemma 1: (I) Let y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Let T := ∪y1∈[0,x1)B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) ⊆
B1. To prove that T is an unhappy set, first we show that x  y for any y ∈ T. Observe
that x ∈M1(x1) = B1(x1). Let y ∈ T. Then y ∈M1(y1) = B1(y1) for some y1 < x1.By
Observation 3(i), we conclude that x  y.
To complete the proof we show that z  y for any z such that z1 > x1. Monotonicity
of preference implies that z % (x1, 0) for any such z. From the preceding paragraph,
we have (x1, 0)  y for any y ∈ T. By transitivity, z  y for any y ∈ T. This proves
that T is an unhappy set. As x1 > 0, the area of T is positive. So Axiom 1 holds.
22
(II) (i) Let S ⊆ B1 has positive area. Then ∃ x ∈ S where x1 > 0. Consider
such x ∈ S. Since y ∼ x for all y ∈ B1(x1) and S is an unhappy set, we must have
B1(x1) ⊆ S.
Next observe that if α1(x1) > 0 for some x ∈ S, we can find y such that y1 = x1
and y2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). Then y /∈ B1, so we have y /∈ S. But x % y (by continuity and
monotonicity of %), which contradicts that S is an unhappy set. Hence for any x ∈ S,
we must have α1(x1) = 0, implying that B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S.
Now we show that if x ∈ S, then y ∈ S for any y such that y1 < x1. To see this,
consider z such that z1 = x1 and z2 > y2. Since B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S, we have z ∈ S.
By monotonicity, z  y. As S is an unhappy set, we must have y ∈ S.
From the preceding paragraphs we conclude that if x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0 for all
y1 ∈ [0, x1] and ∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S. This proves (i).
(ii) First observe that if S, T are two subsets of B1 that are both unhappy sets, then
either S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S. If neither holds, then ∃ x ∈ S, y ∈ T such that x /∈ T, y /∈ S. If
x1 = y1, then y ∈ M1(x1) ⊆ S, a contradiction. So x1 6= y1. W.l.o.g., let y1 < x1. But
then from the last paragraph, we have y ∈M1(y1) ⊆ S, again a contradiction.
Therefore, if Axiom 1 holds, then it has a unique maximal unhappy subset S and
this set has positive area. From part (i) we conclude that either S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1)
or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some 0 < x1 <∞, or S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) If (a) or (b) of (ii) holds, then y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1] (for
(b), the result for y1 = x1 follows from Observation 3(ii)). Suppose, on the contrary ∃
x1 > x1 where the assertion (iii) does not hold. Then for every y1 ∈ (x1, x1), we have
y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0, so that B1(y1) = M1(y1). Let S˜∗ := ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1). Then
S ⊂ S˜∗ ⊆ B1. By part (I), S˜∗ is an unhappy set, which contradicts (II)(ii).
(iv) Suppose on the contrary both B1, B2 have unhappy subsets of positive area.
Then by part (II)(i), for i = 1, 2, ∃ xi > 0 such that xi ∈ Ai and αi(xi) = 0. Then
(x1, 0) ∼ x (since α1(x1) = 0) and (0, x2) ∼ x ∼ (y1, x2) for any y1 > x1 (since
α2(x2) = 0). This implies (x1, 0) ∼ (y1, x2). But since y1 > x1 and x2 > 0, by
monotonicity we must have (y1, x2)  (x1, 0), a contradiction. This proves (iv).
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove (SSI1)⇒ (SSI2).
Proof of subsistence property: Since Axiom 1 holds, by Lemma 1(II)(ii), B1 has a
unique maximal unhappy subset S.
Now we show that S 6= R2+. To see this, first note that since Axiom 1 holds,
by Lemma 1(II)(iv), B2 cannot have an unhappy subset of positive area. Moreover,
by Axiom 2, B2 is non-empty and so is A2. Let x2 ∈ A2, y1 > x1 ≥ α2(x2) and
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y2 = x2. Then x, y ∈ B2(x2), so that x ∼ y. If S = R2+, then x, y ∈ S ⊆ B1. As
x ∈ M1(x1) = B1(x1), y ∈ M1(y1) = B1(y1) and y1 > x1, by Observation 3(i) we have
y  x, a contradiction. So we must have S 6= R2+.
From the preceding paragraph and by Lemma 1(II)(ii) we conclude that either
S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) for some x1 ∈ (0,∞). In either case, by
Observation 3(ii) we have α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Taking Q = x1 proves part
(a) of the subsistence property. Part (I)(b) of SSI preference with respect to Good 1
follows from Lemma 1(II)(iii).
Proof of weak saturation property: Since B2 is non-empty, ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and α2(x2) ≥ 0
such that Good 1 is relevant at x if x1 < α2(x2) and it is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥
α2(x2). Taking Q = α2(x2) proves the weak saturation property. From continuity and
monotonicity of preference it also follows that Q = x1 ≤ Q = α2(x2) and the inequality
is strict if x2 > 0.
We now prove (SSI2)⇒(SSI1). We consider the SSI preference with respect to
Good 1 and show that it satisfies Axiom 1. Observe from the subsistence property
that [0, Q] ⊆ A1 and B1(x1) = M1(x1) for all x1 ∈ [0, Q]. Then by Lemma 1(I), it
follows that Axiom 1 holds. To show that Axiom 2 holds, observe from the weak
saturation property that {x ∈ X|x1 ≥ Q} ⊆ B2 so that B2 is non-empty.
Proof of Corollary 1: We first prove (S1)⇒ (S2). Since Axiom 1 holds, by Lemma
1(II)(ii), B1 has a unique maximal unhappy subset S. If either (a) or (b) of Lemma
1(II)(ii) holds, then property (I) of Definition 2 holds. So suppose (c) of Lemma 1(II)(ii)
holds, i.e., S = R2+. Then A1 = R+ and α1(x1) = 0 for all x1 ∈ R+, implying that
Good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles.
To prove (S2)⇒ (S1), if property (I) of Definition 2 holds, then from the proof
of Theorem 1 it follows that Axiom 1 holds. Otherwise, B1 = R2+, which is itself an
unhappy set of positive area.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose the preference % on X is lexicographic with linear
order 1 <0 2. Consider any x = (x1, x2) ∈ X. Take any y ∈ T (x1) and any z 6∈ T (x1).
Then z1 > x1 ≥ y1 and hence z  y.12 This shows that T (x1) is an unhappy set for
any x1 ∈ X1.
To prove the converse, take any x, y ∈ X. If y1 > x1, then y 6∈ T (x1) and since
T (x1) is an unhappy set, y  x. Using completeness of preference,
(a) if x % y, then x1 ≥ y1.
12For a lexicographic preference with linear order 1 <0 2, z  y if and only if either z1 > y1 or
z1 = y1 and z2 > y2.
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If y1 ≥ x1 and y2 > x2, then by strong monotonicity y  x. Therefore, by completeness
and condition (a) if x % y, then either x1 > y1 or x1 = y1 and x2 ≥ y2. Hence we have
lexicographic preference with linear order 1 <0 2.
5.3 GL preferences
To prove Theorem 2 we will use the following lemmas. Given Axiom 4, Lemma 2
shows that if a good is irrelevant (relevant) at a bundle and its amount is decreased
(increased), then it continues to be irrelevant (relevant) at the new bundle.
Lemma 2 Suppose % satisfies Axiom 4.
(I) Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. For any xi ∈ Xi, fi(x) is non-decreasing in xj.
(II) If xi ∈ Ai, then yi ∈ Ai and αi(yi) ≤ αi(xi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi).
Proof: W.l.o.g. take i = 1 and j = 2.
(I) We have to show that f2(y1, x2) ≤ f2(x) for all y1 < x1 and f2(y1, x2) ≥ f2(x)
for all y1 > x1. Since f2(.) equals 0 or 1, it is sufficient to show: (a) if f2(x) = 0, then
f2(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 < x1 and (b) if f2(x) = 1, then f2(y1, x2) = 1 for all y1 > x1.
If (a) does not hold, then ∃ x and y1 < x1 such that f2(x) = 0 and f2(y1, x2) = 1,
i.e., (y1, x2) /∈ B1. By Axiom 4, we must have (y1, x2) ∈ B2, so that α2(x2) ≤ y1 < x1.
Hence (y1, x2), x ∈ B2(x2), implying (y1, x2) ∼ x. Since f2(x) = 0, we have x ∼ (x1, z2)
for any z2 > x2. By transitivity, (y1, x2) ∼ (x1, z2) which violates monotonicity, so
(a) must hold. If (b) does not hold, then ∃ z and z˜1 > z1 such that f2(z) = 1 and
f2(z˜1, z2) = 0. Taking x1 = z˜1, x2 = z2 and y1 = z1 contradicts (a). Hence (b) must
hold.
(II) If x1 ∈ A1, then ∃ α1(x1) = x2 such that f2(x1, y2) = 0 ∀ y2 ≥ x2. By Lemma
2(I), for any y1 ∈ [0, x1), we have f2(y1, x2) = 0. By definition of α1(.), we have
α1(y1) ≤ x2 = α1(x1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1).
Since Ai = Xi (by Axiom 4), αi(.) is defined for any xi ∈ Xi. Lemma 3 derives
properties of this function and as a consequence we get the function F (.) specified in
the definition of GL preference.
Lemma 3 Suppose the preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 3 and Axiom 4.
The following hold for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
(I) αi(xi) > 0 for any xi > 0.
(II) αi(0) = 0.
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(III) αj(αi(xi)) = xi.
(IV) αi(xi) is increasing for all xi ≥ 0.
(V) αi(xi) is an onto function from Xi to Xj, i.e., for every xj ∈ Xj, ∃ xi ∈ Xi such
that αi(xi) = xj.
Proof: W.l.o.g., take i = 1, j = 2.
(I) Suppose on the contrary α1(x1) = 0 for some x1 > 0. Then by Lemma 2(II),
α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Then by Lemma 1(I), Axiom 1 holds, contradicting
Axiom 3.
(II) Suppose on the contrary α1(0) = x2 > 0. Let y2 ∈ (0, x2). Then (0, y2) /∈ B1
(since y2 < α1(0)) and (0, y2) /∈ B2 (since 0 < α2(y2), part (I)), i.e., y2 /∈ B1 ∪ B2,
which contradicts Axiom 4.
(III) By (II), the result clearly hold for x1 = 0, so let x1 > 0. Then α1(x1) > 0 (by
(I)). Let x2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). Then x /∈ B1, so by Axiom 4 we must have x ∈ B2, implying
that α2(x2) ≤ x1 for all x2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). By continuity,13 we have α2(α1(x1)) ≤ x1.
Denote α1(x1) = y2 and α2(y2) = y1. If y1 < x1, then y, (x1, y2) ∈ B2(y2), so
that y ∼ (x1, y2). Let z2 > y2 = α1(x1). Then (x1, z2), (x1, y2) ∈ B1(x1), implying
(x1, z2) ∼ (x1, y2). By transitivity, y ∼ (x1, z2), a contradiction (since x1 > y1 and
z2 > y2). Hence we must have y1 ≥ x1, i.e., α2(α1(x1)) ≥ x1. From the conclusion of
the previous paragraph, we conclude that α2(α1(x1)) = x1.
(IV) Since α1(0) = 0 and α1(x1) > 0 for any x1 > 0, α1(x1) is increasing at
x1 = 0. By Lemma 2(II), α1(x1) is non-decreasing. If it is not increasing for all x1 > 0,
∃ x1 > y1 > 0 such that α1(x1) = α1(y1) = x2 > 0. By part (III), we then have
α2(x2) = α2(α1(x1)) = x1 and α2(x2) = α2(α1(y1)) = y1 < x1, a contradiction.
(V) By (II), the result holds for x2 = 0. Suppose ∃ x2 > 0 such that α1(x1) 6= x2
∀ x1 ∈ X1. Since α1(.) is continuous and α1(0) = 0, we must have α1(x1) < x2 for all
x1 ∈ X1. By Axiom 4, A2 = X2. Hence x2 ∈ A2 and α2(x2) is well defined. Taking
x1 = α2(x2) above, we have α1(α2(x2)) < x2, which contradicts (III).
Proof of Theorem 2: (L1) ⇒ (L2) By Axiom 4, for i = 1, 2, Ai = Xi and αi(xi) is
well defined for all xi ∈ Xi. Note from Lemma 3 that α1(.) : X1 → X2 is an increasing
and onto function with α1(0) = 0 (the same property holds for α2(.) : X2 → X1 and
α2(.) is the inverse function of α1(.)). Taking F (x1) = α1(x1), by Lemma 3(III) it
follows that (i)-(iii) of Definition 4 hold.
13Let x2 = α1(x1). Suppose α2(x2) = y1 > x1 and let y2 = x2. Then y  x. For any neighborhoods
Ny, Nx around y, x we can find z ∈ Ny, z˜ ∈ Nx such that z2 = z˜2 < x2 = α1(x1) and z1 > z˜1 ≥ x1.
Since x1 ≥ α2(z2), we have z, z˜ ∈ B2(z2), so that z ∼ z˜. This contradicts continuity of % (see, e.g.,
Rubenstein [10]), proving that α2(α1(x1)) ≤ x1.
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(L2) ⇒ (L1) Suppose the preference is generalized Leontief. Then for i = 1, 2,
Ai = Xi = R+. For any x1 ∈ X1, we have α1(x1) = F (x1) and for any x2 ∈ A2, we
have α2(x2) = F
−1(x2), and F (0) = 0. Hence B1(x1) = {(x1, x2)|x2 ≥ F (x1)} and
B2(x2) = {(x1, x2)|x1 ≥ F−1(x2)}. So we have Bi = ∪xi∈XiBi(xi) for i = 1, 2, and
B1 ∪B2 = X. Therefore, Axiom 4 holds.
It remains to show that Axiom 3 holds. If for some i = 1, 2, ∃ S ⊆ Bi such that S
is an unhappy set of positive area, then ∃ x ∈ S such that xi > 0. By Lemma 1(II)(i),
this will imply that αi(xi) = 0 for all yi ∈ [0, xi], a contradiction since αi(yi) > 0 for
all yi > 0.
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